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Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2227 Shadow Canyon, 133 Nev. Adv. Op.
409 (Nov. 22, 2017)1
PROPERTY LAW: HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATION FORECLOSURE SALES
Summary
The Court considered an appeal from a district court order granting summary judgment. In
its holding, the Court concluded that it would not invalidate a foreclosure sale based on a low sales
price alone. The commercial reasonableness standard established by Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) does not apply to Homeowner’s Association (HOA) foreclosures
because they involve real property sales. Rather, there must be a showing of “fraud, unfairness,
or oppression” on behalf of the seller.2
Background
The property in dispute was in a neighborhood overseen by an HOA. The previous
homeowner had obtained a loan to purchase the property and secured that loan via a deed of trust
that was later assigned to Appellant Nationstar. When the previous homeowner became
delinquent, the HOA agent entered a notice of default and a notice of sale, and then sold the
property at a foreclosure sale to Saticoy Bay for $35,000. After the sale, Saticoy Bay sought a
declaration to extinguish Nationstar’s deed of trust so that Saticoy Bay would have an
unencumbered title to the property.
In response, Nationstar argued that sales price for the property was commercially
unreasonable as the appraisal value was listed at $335,000. Nationstar’s relied on the Restatement
(Third) of Property: Mortgages § 8.3 (1997).3 Saticoy Bay rebutted with the contention that
“commercial reasonableness” was not relevant in relation to HOA foreclosure sales. The parties
went to court and ultimately Saticoy Bay won on summary judgment after the court concluded that
Article 9 of the U.C.C. does not apply to HOA foreclosure sales.
Discussion
The first matter relevant to this case was whether the U.C.C. Article 9’s portion on
commercial reasonableness applies to an HOA’s foreclosure sale of real property. The Court
concluded it had no bearing on the matter because Nevada already has requirements that an HOA
must follow when foreclosing on real property to secure its lien. In addition, there is nothing in
the U.C.C. to indicate the drafters intended the commercial reasonableness standard to apply to
real property foreclosure sales. The Court then established that no matter how grossly inadequate
a price may be, it is not grounds to set aside a sale.4 Finally, because Nationstar did not illustrate
any form of fraud, unfairness, or oppression the Court upheld the district court’s ruling of summary
judgment.
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U.C.C. Article 9’s commercial reasonableness standard is inapplicable in the context of an HOA
foreclosure sale of real property
Article 9 of the U.C.C. lays out the general framework whereby a person may obtain money
from a creditor in exchange for granting a security interest in personal property.5 It also states how
a creditor may repossess and dispose of personal property if a debtor has defaulted.6 The Court
has previously recognized (at least implicitly) two things: (1) the secured creditor has an
affirmative obligation to obtain the highest sales price possible; and (2) if the sale is challenged,
the secured creditor has the burden of establishing commercial reasonableness.7 Nationstar
contended, therefore, that the HOA had the burden of establishing that it took all the steps to obtain
the highest sales price possible.
The Court disagreed with Nationstar’s argument. In contrast to Article 9, NRS Chapter
116 already provides intricate requirements that an HOA must follow to foreclose on the real
property securing its lien.8 This statutory scheme infringes on an HOA’s ability to increase the
winning bid at sale and therefore makes Article 9’s commercial reasonableness standard improper
for HOA foreclosure sales of real property.
The Court supported its holding by pointing to the Uniform Common Interest Ownership
Act (UCIOA), which NRS Chapter 116 is modeled after.9 The UCIOA recognizes that there are
three different types of common-interest communities and in one of those, the owner’s interest in
his or her property is characterized as a “personal property” interest.10 These types of common
interest communities are: (1) a condominium or planned community,” (2) “a cooperative whose
unit owners’ interest in the units are real estate,” and (3) “a cooperative whose unit owners’
interests in the units are personal property.”11 A state adopting UCIOA provisions is prompted by
the UCIOA to choose and insert the following methods of sale for the three common interest
community types:
(1) In a condominium or planned community, the association’s lien
must be foreclosed in like manner as a mortgage on real estate
[or by power of sale under appropriate state statute];
(2) In a cooperative whose unit owners’ interests in the units are real
estate . . . , the association’s lien must be foreclosed in like
manner as a mortgage on real estate [or by power of sale under
the appropriate state statute] [or by power of sale under
subsection (k)]; or
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(3) In a cooperative whose unit owners interests in the units are
personal property . . . , the association’s lien must be foreclosed
in like manner as a security interest under.12
Had the UCIOA drafters intended for Article‘s commercial reasonableness standard to apply to
real property foreclosures and to personal property foreclosures, it is likely that they would have
included such language in subsections (j)(1) and (2) of the Act.13
A low sales price, in and of itself, does not warrant invalidating an HOA foreclosure sale
In previous cases, the Court established the held that “demonstrating that an association
sold a property at its foreclosure sale for an inadequate price is not enough to set aside that sale;
there must also be a showing of fraud, unfairness, or oppression.”14
Nationstar contended that the Court had previously adopted the Restatement’s suggestion
that a sale for less than 20 percent of the property’s fair market value may “[g]enerally” be
invalidated by a court.15 However, simply because this assertion was previously cited in a case
does not mean the Court implicitly adopted it. In fact, this adoption would be inconsistent with the
Court’s previous holding in Golden v. Tamiyasu, where it held that the “inadequacy of price,
however gross, is not in itself a sufficient ground for setting aside a trustee’s sale” without “proof
of some element of fraud, unfairness, or oppression.”16
Price is not completely irrelevant. It is not sufficient by itself to invalidate a foreclosure
sale, but when accompanied by irregularities in the sales process that demonstrate fraud,
unfairness, or oppression, it should be considered.17
Nationstar’s identified irregularities do not show that the HOA foreclosure sale was affected by
fraud, unfairness, or oppression
Nationstar pointed to three irregularities in the process of the foreclosure sale that indicated
fraud, unfairness, or oppression: (1) the HOA’s lien included fines in addition to monthly
assessments even though NRS 116.31162(5) prohibits an HOA from foreclosing on a lien
comprised of fines; (2) the notice of sale listed the unpaid lien amount as of the day the notice of
sale was generated even though NRS 116.311635(3)(a) requires the notice of sale to list what the
unpaid lien amount will be on the date of the to-be-held sale; and (3) the person who signed the
notice of default was not the person who the HOA’s president designated to sign the notice, which
violated NRS 116.31162(2). The Court addressed these arguments individually.
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Foreclosure of a lien that includes fines does not invalidate the sale
Nationstar’s interpretation of NRS 116.31162(5) is incorrect. This statute authorizes an
HOA’s lien, and provides that an HOA has a lien for fines and monthly assessments and that those
fines and monthly assessments automatically become part of the HOA’s lien as soon as they
become due. Under Nationstar’s construction, an HOA could not foreclose on a homeowner if it
had imposed a fine. However, there is no indication that the Legislature intended the result that
Nationstar proposed. It is apparent that the Legislature’s intended to prohibit an HOA from
foreclosing on a lien that was comprised soley of fines because the Legislature did not consider
NRS 116.3116(1) when it enacted NRS 116.31162(5),.18
Nationstar also suggested that there was unfairness in the sale because all the foreclosure
proceeds were distributed to the HOA instead of the HOA’s superpriority lien amount. However,
Satico Bay correctly pointed out that NRS 116.31166(2) absolved it of any responsibility to ensure
that the sale proceeds are properly distributed.
The notice of sale’s failure to list the unpaid lien amount on the date of the sale does not
amount to fraud, unfairness, or oppression
Nationstar’s second argument centered around NRS 116.311635(3)(a), which states that
the notice of sale “must include [t]he amount necessary to satisfy the lien as of the date of the
proposed sale.” In this case, the notice of sale listed the unpaid lien amount as of the date the
notice was generated not as of the date of the future sale. Even though the HOA’s notice of sale
did amount to a violation of the statute, it did not amount to fraud, unfairness, or oppression.
The person who signed the notice of default was authorized by the HOA to do so
Nationstar’s last argument was based upon NRS 116.31162(2), which states that the notice
of default “must be signed by the person designated in the declaration or by the association for that
purpose or, if no one is designated, by the president of the association.” Specifically, Nationstar
argued that the HOA violated this statute because its notice of default was signed by an employee
of the HOA’s agent and there is no evidence showing that the HOA’s declaration or the HOA’s
president specifically designated this employee as the person who could sign this notice of default.
The reason this argument is faulted is because a person may be designated to sign the notice
in three ways, one of which is by the association. So, “the association” can designate a person to
sign even if the declaration or president do not sign the notice.
Conclusion
The Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. It held that even though
the $35,000 sales price of the foreclosed property was below its appraised value, such a low sales
price does not invalidate a foreclosure sale as a matter of law. Instead, there must be a
demonstration of fraud, unfairness, or oppression, which in this case, Nationstar failed to show.
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